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rAbstract
This study reviews and evaluates the motives and incentives behind immigrants’
religiosity, focusing on the two sides of the Atlantic – Europe and the United States.
The contribution of the study is mainly empirical, trying to identify indicators for the
type of incentive – whether immigrants’ religiosity serves as a ‘bridge’ or a ‘buffer’ in
the process of adaptation to the receiving country. The statistical analysis draws on
data from several waves of the European Social Survey (ESS), the American General
Social Survey (GSS), and the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Estimation of
extended ‘mass participation equations’ and ‘prayer equations’ leads to the following
findings: (a) immigrants are indeed more religious than the populations in the receiving
countries, both in Europe and in the United States; and (b) while in the United States
the religiosity of immigrants serves as a bridge between the immigrants and the local
population, in Europe it has mainly the function of a buffer and of a “balm for the soul”.
There is an extensive literature on the ‘bridge versus buffer’ (or ‘bridge versus
boundary’) theories and their different implications in the United States and in
Europe. However, to the best of our knowledge, our paper presents an innovative
attempt to disentangle the two types of motives and to show that while the former
is more relevant in the United States, the latter dominates in Europe.
JEL codes: J11; J15; Z12; Z13
Keywords: Immigration; Religion; Integration; Europe; The United States;
Bridge; Buffer1. Introduction and motivation
The religiosity of immigrants has received the increasing attention of social scientists.
The Religiosity of immigrants is important from a social perspective as well due to the
massive inflow of immigrants into Western countries, who now constitute a significant
share of the population in many countries and substantially affect the economy and so-
ciety in their countries of residence. Religiosity is an important factor in the adaptation
process and reflects on social and economic outcomes. Because religiosity has behav-
ioral aspects (e.g., marriage and fertility), it also has long-term consequences and will
affect future demographic and cultural transitions. A better understanding of the vari-
ous facets of immigrant religiosity can lead to improved forecasting of these future
transitions and a better preparation for the outcomes. Comprehensive databases, in-
cluding cross-national and longitudinal surveys, are now accessible, thus facilitating
careful statistical analyses.Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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main unanswered. While it is believed that immigrants tend to be more religious than
the native population, the incentives behind the intensified religiosity of immigrants are
less clear. In particular: is immigrants’ religious performance driven by socio-economic
motives relating to the establishment of networks and bridges that connect them to the
local population, or does it stem from psychological bonding and comforting motives,
serving as a “balm for the soul” and as a buffer against the hardships of integration?
These two types of motives have been discussed in the literature (e.g., Casanova 2007;
Fonner and Alba 2008; Connor and Koenig 2013; see the more detailed review below)
but have not been tested empirically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-
novative attempt to disentangle the two types of motives and show which of the two is
dominant.
We claim that the dominance of one type of incentive over the other is country spe-
cific. While in the United States the religiosity of immigrants serves as a bridge that
leads to the integration of immigrants in the host population, in Europe the bonding
motives are more powerful. The question of the principal incentive is important and
has long-term consequences: a dominant bridging motive leads to the better integration
of immigrants, while a buffering/bonding motive could lead to alienation and hostility
against immigrants. The constant inflow of immigrants into Europe and the United
States, and in particular the growing share of the Moslem immigrant community,
intensifies the social perspectives of the immigration-religiosity intersection.
Based on the existing literature and on statistical analyses of several datasets (the
International Social Survey Program – ISSP: Module Religion, 2008; the European
Social Survey – ESS, waves 2002-2010; and the American General Social Survey – GSS,
waves 2002-2010), we aim to offer quantitative contributions to the literature on the
motives behind the immigration-religiosity interaction on the two sides of the Atlantic -
Europe and the United States. We first start with descriptive statistics on foreign-born
populations and the religious landscape of the native and immigrant populations in
European countries and in the United States. In particular, we examine the religion
and religiosity of immigrants, compared with the religion/religiosity of natives in the
receiving countries. These immigrant-native differences, coupled with differences in
fertility, will obviously shape future changes in the religious landscapes of European
countries. Second, following background information, we explore a core issue that
relates to motives and incentives behind immigrants’ religiosity. The bridging versus
the bonding theories is tested and cases of European countries versus the United States
are contrasted.
The historical differences in the state-religion relationship, immigration policies and
concepts lead to the expectation of different motives. It is likely that immigrants’ religi-
osity has a bridging motive in the United States, given that the country was founded on
the immigration of people from different religious backgrounds, while Europe has in-
stead strong national religious connotations. In Europe, the religiosity of immigrants
will therefore stem from bonding motives and serve as a buffer against the adversities
of adaptation. Regression analysis indeed unravels a pronounced ‘bridging’ motive in
the United States versus a noticeable ‘bonding-buffer’ component in Europe. It should
be noted that our empirical analysis tries to disentangle and identify indicators of
motives/incentives for the religious performance of immigrants and sort them out
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the religiosity of immigrants and consecutive economic and social integration outcomes,
such as educational attainments, employment, earnings or occupational attainments1.
The article is structured as follows: the next section presents background information
and a literature overview on immigration and religiosity in the United States and
Europe, focusing on the ‘bridging’ versus the ‘buffer-bonding’ elements. An empirical
analysis aiming at unraveling the motives behind immigrants’ religiosity follows in the
third section, while the last section summarizes and concludes.2. Immigration, religiosity, and the religious landscape – background
information and a literature overview
2.1 Background figures and information
The United Nations report that, in 2010, 213.9 million people, constituting 3.1 percent
of the world population, were migrants who lived and worked in a country in which
they were not born. Europe had a share of 32.6 percent of the world migrants’ stock,
while the United States hosted 20 percent of world migrants. Moreover, the flow of im-
migrants has constantly increased over the last two decades. According to estimates by
the United Nations, there were 155.5 million migrants in 1990. It therefore follows that
the number of migrants increased by 37.5 percent between 1990 and 2010. This in-
crease is even more striking in Europe (41.3 percent) and soars to 84.1 percent in the
United States (United Nations Population Division 2009). Indeed, in the last several de-
cades, the United States and Western Europe have become the main destinations of
immigration, and they will be the focus of this study2.
The United Sates has a long tradition of immigration. In the 19th century and the
early 20th century, immigrants arrived mainly from Europe, with more recent immi-
grants arriving mostly from Asia and the Americas. The top five sending countries in
2010 were Mexico, China, India, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic (Monger
and Yankay 2011).
For Europe, the new immigration trend means a drastic reversal of a long history of
emigration to the rest of the world, and in particular to the United States3. Indeed,
Western Europe has changed its immigration status from a ‘sending’ to a ‘receiving’
society.
Immigration flows into Western Europe came from several countries. Immigrants
from the former colonies of European countries (in North and West Africa, and South
and Southeast Asia) arrived in France, England and the Netherlands; migrant labor
from the less developed Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece,
Yugoslavia, and Turkey) were attracted by “guest-workers” programs4; refugees, asylum
seekers and illegal migrants fled (and are still fleeing) from less privileged regions that
suffer from famines, wars and political violence; and immigrants from the Former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe left their native countries when the gates opened
after the collapse of communism in 19895.
Country-specific information can be gained from Table 1, which presents the sizes
(in 1000 s) and shares of foreign-born populations in Europe for the year 2010. As
the table indicates, immigrants comprise more than 10 percent of the local population
in a large number of European countries. In the top ranks we find Luxembourg (32.5
Table 1 Foreign-born populations in Europe by country, 2010




(1000 s) (%) (% in total population)
Austria 1,276.0 15.2 9.1
Belgium 1,503.8 13.9 7.0
Cyprus 150.7 18.8 13.5
The Czech Rep. 398.5 3.8 2.6
Denmark 500.8 9.0 6.3
Estonia 217.9 16.3 15.0
Finland 228.5 4.3 2.8
France 7,196.5 11.1 7.8
Germany 9,812.3 12.0 7.8
Greece 125.6 11.1 8.3
Hungary 436.6 4.4 1.4
Iceland 35.1 11.0 3.7
Ireland 565.6 12.7 2.9
Italy 4,798.7 8.0 5.3
Latvia 343.3 15.3 13.6
Luxembourg 163.1 32.5 5.6
The Netherlands 1,832.5 11.1 8.5
Norway 524.6 10.8 6.5
Poland 456.4 1.2 0.7
Portugal 793.1 7.5 5.7
Slovakia 50.4 0.9 0.4
Slovenia 253.8 12.4 11.0
Spain 6,442.8 14.0 8.9
Sweden 1,337.2 14.3 9.2
UK 7,012.4 11.3 7.7
Source: Eurostat (online data access: tps00178, migr_pop3ctb).
Notes: Data are not available for Bulgaria, Croatia, Switzerland and Ukraine. The Slovakian data are for the year 2009.
The Belgian data are provisional.
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(16.3 percent). The share of immigrants is below 5 percent in only a few countries
(Slovakia ranks last with immigrants comprising only 0.9 percent of the total
population). The majority of immigrants were born in non-European countries.
One of the most pronounced consequences of the intensified immigration to the
United States and to Europe has been the growth in religious diversity. The United
States already had a religiously diverse population and religious pluralism, while
Europe had limited religious pluralism and therefore the change due to immigration was
much more significant.
Table 2 displays information on the two major religions – both within the native
population and within first-generation immigrant populations6.
As indicated in Table 2, immigration has changed the religious landscape of many
European countries, the most significant change being the increasing share of Moslems.
When we examine the native populations, Islam is the second largest religion in only
three countries (Bulgaria, Greece and Russia). Within first-generation immigrant popu-
lations, the distribution of religions is very different: Islam is the first largest religion in
Table 2 Major religions among natives and first-generation immigrants in European










Austria Catholic Protestant Catholic Islam
Belgium Catholic Other-Christian Catholic Islam
Bulgaria Orthodox Islam Orthodox Islam
Croatia Catholic Orthodox Catholic Orthodox
Cyprus Orthodox Catholic Orthodox Catholic
The Czech Rep. Catholic Protestant Catholic Other-Christian
Denmark Protestant Other-Christian Islam Protestant
Estonia Protestant Orthodox Orthodox Catholic
Finland Protestant Other-Christian Protestant Orthodox
France Catholic Protestant Catholic Islam
Germany Protestant Catholic Catholic Islam
Greece Orthodox Islam Orthodox Islam
Hungary Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Ireland Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Italy Catholic Protestant Catholic Islam
Latvia Catholic Protestant Orthodox Catholic
Luxembourg Catholic Other-Christian Catholic Other-Christian
The Netherlands Catholic Protestant Islam Catholic
Norway Protestant Other Christian Islam Protestant
Poland Catholic Orthodox Catholic Islam
Portugal Catholic Other-Christian Catholic Other-Christian
Russia Orthodox Islam Orthodox Islam
Slovakia Catholic Protestant Catholic Protestant
Slovenia Catholic Protestant Catholic Orthodox
Spain Catholic Other-Christian Catholic Islam
Sweden Protestant Other-Christian Islam Protestant
Switzerland Protestant Catholic Catholic Protestant
Ukraine Orthodox Catholic Orthodox Islam
United Kingdom Protestant Catholic Catholic Islam
United States Evangelical- Protestant Catholic Catholic Evangelical-Protestant
Source: ESS and GSS, waves 2002-2010.
Note: Catholic refers to ‘Roman Catholic’. ‘Other-Christian’ is a Christian denomination other than Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox.
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also in the Netherlands). In another 12 countries, Islam is the second largest religion.
Numerous studies have tried to explore whether the traumatic act of immigration is
leading to changes in the religious behavior of the immigrating individuals. In particu-
lar, researchers asked if an intensified religious performance of the incoming immi-
grants is observed. Smith (1978) argued that immigration is a “theologizing experience”
leading to intensified religiosity. Williams (1988) stated that (in the United States) “im-
migrants are religious – by all counts more religious than they were before they left
home” (page 29). In the same vein, Warner (2000) argued that "many of these immi-
grants (to the US) are deeply involved in their religions" (page 269), and therefore "reli-
gion is more salient for immigrants" (page 273). Sociologists undertook a series of case
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generally confirmed the hypothesis of the intensified religiosity of immigrants (e.g.,
Warner and Wittner 1998; Ebaugh et al. 2000; Min and Kim 2002). Using the European
Social Survey, Aleksynska and Chiswick (2013) show that, on average, the religiosity of
immigrants is greater than that of the native born and is also greater than the religiosity
of stayers in the European countries of origin. The regression analysis performed by the
authors and reported in the next section also shows that immigrants (both in Europe
and in the United States) are more religious than natives.
There are also, however, other voices and studies that have claimed the opposite.
Wuthnow and Christiano (1979) argued that migration is inherently disruptive and
leads to reduced participation in religious services after the move. One could argue that
new immigrants lack time and also infrastructural opportunities for religious perform-
ance, especially if they belong to a religious minority. Some recent studies have indi-
cated a drop in participation shortly after immigration (e.g., Connor 2008 - in a study
of immigrants to Quebec; Connor 2009 – in a study for immigrants to Canada; Massey
and Higgins, 2011 – who examine immigrants to the US; Breton 2012 – for a recent re-
view; and Diehl et al. 2013 – who look at Turkish and Polish immigrants in Germany).
It could well be the case that these two pieces of evidence are complementary rather
than contradictory: they simply look at different points in time since migration.
Evidence shows that, shortly after migration, religious performance decreases to later
recover and even intensify. In order to test such a time-dependent hypothesis, longitu-
dinal data are helpful. Indeed, Connor (2008) used a completed longitudinal immigrant
data source for immigrants to Quebec (in the 1990s), Massey and Higgins (2011) used
the first wave of a survey that examined newly arrived legal immigrants to the United
States (in 2003), and Diehl et al. (2013) employed the uncompleted Norface longitu-
dinal survey, which comprises a survey of recent arrivals in Germany, the Netherlands,
the UK and Ireland7. The three studies arrived at similar results regarding a decrease in
religious participation shortly after migration. Cross-section data sometimes include a
question about time since migration (e.g., the ESS) that can be used to examine the
evolution of religiosity of immigrants over time. As we report later (Table 3), the ESS
data demonstrate that in the first year after arrival in the receiving country, immigrants
in Europe are not statistically different from the native populations in terms of attend-
ance at church services. Stratification by religious denomination demonstrates different
patterns of the magnitude of decline. Connor (2008) found that the decrease is larger
for immigrants adhering to a minority religion, probably because they have less access
to information about places of worship. Similarly, Diehl et al. (2013) documented a
more pronounced decline among Moslem Turks than among Catholic Poles who im-
migrated to Germany.
In the United States, the pattern seems to be different. Massey and Higgins (2011)
showed that the largest decline is evidenced among Christians and in particular among
Catholics (56 percent attended church services at least once a week before immigration,
compared to only 26 percent shortly afterwards). The changes are less pronounced
within the minority religions. After the busy and hectic period of settling in the host
country, religious performance seems to increase. For instance, Diehl et al. (2013)
found that the decline in religious participation shortly after migration is temporary, in
particular in the case of the Turkish Moslems who resume (high) pre-migration levels
Table 3 Attendance at religious services and prayer in Europe, 2002-2010
(adding ‘time since migration’ variables)
Variables Attendance at religious services Frequency of prayer
EUROPE EUROPE
Immigrant var.
First-generation immigrants - immigrated
In last year 0.344 0.950**
1to 5 years ago 0.387*** 1.228***
6 to 10 years ago 0.336*** 0.838***
11to 20 years ago 0.311*** 0.653***
More than 20 years ago 0.189 0.373*
Second-generation immigrants 0.167* 0.355**
Socio-economic vars. Yes Yes
Religion denomination variables Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes
Sample size 107,361 107,361
R-squared 0.183 0.191
*p-value < 0.10; **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value < 0.01.
Notes: Data on ‘time since migration’ is not available for the US.
Reference group = Native residents.
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tensify attendance at church services after the first year in the host country, so that im-
migrants who reside in the country from 1 to 20 years are significantly more active in
terms of church attendance compared to the native populations (Table 3).
The core questions that this study tries to unravel are: are immigrants indeed more
religious than the native populations, and if the answer is positive - what are the mo-
tives behind immigrants’ intensified religiosity, and are they country specific? In par-
ticular, are the motives different in European countries and in the United States?
2.2 Is religiosity of immigrants a ‘bridge’ or a ‘buffer’?
Two competing theories offer explanations for the possible motives and consequences
of immigrants’ intensive religiosity. The two explanations lead to different predictions
about the interrelationship between immigrant religiosity and integration into the local
community: (a) the first one sees religiosity and religious organizations as a ‘bridge’ that
facilitates immigrant integration and mobility; while (b) the second one claims that re-
ligiosity and religious institutions are a 'buffer' against the hardships in the receiving
country, in particular for weaker and more vulnerable immigrants.
a) The bridging role of religion in the process of assimilation: Herberg (1960) was
probably the first to emphasize the role of religion in the process of assimilation
(in the United States), arguing that the immigrant’s religiosity is often the sole self-
identifier that American society does not challenge in the immigrant’s assimilation
into the new society. It therefore has the potential of replacing ethnic and national
identities, and thus helps immigrants to craft an American identity. In a very similar
vein, Smith (1978) argued that immigrants use religion to ease assimilation into the
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their ethnic/national/racial differences become less pronounced, and diverse
communities are brought together with the native local community through
shared worship. Religious identification could therefore be a factor that enables
newcomers to overcome social isolation, because religion is universal and not
bound to a particular place or country of origin. Moreover, religious institutions
can help immigrants to acquire the social and civic skills that will soften the
assimilation process. Many religious communities offer a host of resources:
advice on adapting to the new environment and information regarding economic
opportunities in the receiving society; help in obtaining jobs, housing, or loans;
schools and language classes; and social services (e.g., Ebaugh et al. 2000; Munshi
2003; Hirschman 2004; Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Activity in religious
organizations creates further opportunities for civic and community
engagement (Ramakrishnan et al. 2006).
b) Religiosity as a ‘buffer’ : it is claimed that immigrants use religiosity as a ‘buffer’
against hardships in the new receiving country. The migratory event amounts to a
traumatic experience, and like other experiences of anomaly and existential
insecurity, it increases receptivity to religious belief. Such religious beliefs and
identities may translate into active participation in religious institutions. Religion
therefore serves as “balm for the soul” (Connor 2012), providing comfort and
mitigating loneliness (Chiswick 2003; Waite and Lehrer 2003). The basic
mechanism implied in this argument is psychological and could lead to a slowdown
in the process of assimilation, serve as a 'mobility trap' (Cadge and Ecklund 2006),
and religiosity will consequently become a ‘barrier’ (rather than a ‘bridge’) in the
process of adaptation. Several studies have documented indirect indications for the
‘buffer’ option. For example, using pilot data from the American New Immigrant
Survey (NIS), Cadge and Ecklund (2006) found that the immigrants who are less
integrated into American society (older, unemployed, speaking a non-English lan-
guage at home) are more likely to regularly attend religious services; in a cross-
national study that covers European countries, van Tubergen and Sindradóttir
(2011) found that religiosity is higher among immigrants who are unemployed and
less educated, while Ramakrishnan et al. (2006) claimed that religiosity might be
particularly limiting for immigrant women since religious attitudes and beliefs
regarding gender roles (as mothers and care givers at home) prevent them from
engaging in activities in the labor market and the public sphere. The study of
Constant et al. (2006) looked at ethnic minority groups in Germany and reported
that non-religious individuals perform better than religious ones. Obviously, causality
could run in the opposite direction: from failure to integrate in the host country to
participation in church activities, rather than the proposed causality that goes from
church attendance to lower integration. Religious activities can serve as a “balm for
the soul” (Connor 2012) for those who failed to integrate into the local society and
labor market.
Putnam (2000) presented related ideas and described two types of social capital that
can serve as measures of the prospects of immigrants’ assimilation: (a) ‘bridging capital’,
which relates to the links between communities and bridges between immigrants and
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the immigrant community; and (b) ‘bonding capital’, which helps to establish close
links with members within a community. As religiosity is a key component of
human/social capital, we can apply his concepts of ‘bridging capital’ versus ‘bonding
capital’ to the religious arena, and connect it to the previously mentioned theories of
religiosity as a ‘bridge’ versus a ‘buffer’. Those who refer to religiosity as a ‘bridge’ believe
that religiosity should be characterized as ‘bridging capital’. Researchers who claim
that religion, religiosity and religious organizations are a ‘buffer’ and shock-absorber for
immigrants would argue that it is basically ‘bonding capital’ that helps individuals within
their community.
The religious practices of immigrants most likely combine components of the two
types of social capital. Church services, prayers and religious rituals provide worshipers
with a familiar, cyclical rhythm and represent continuity between life in the home
country and life in the host country (Tiilikainen 2003), while also helping them estab-
lish new ties with the native population and adapt to the new country of residence.
Ebaugh and Chafetz (1999) concluded that “Religious institutions are the physical and
social spaces where the changes required by the new social milieu and the continuities
desired by immigrant members can be achieved”.
The interrelationship between immigrants’ religiosity and their integration into the
local native population is also central for long-term considerations. In particular: will
the growing numbers of Moslem immigrants increase or attenuate prejudice/distaste
against the Moslem immigrant community? The literature offers two opposing theories
that are closely related to the motives of immigrants’ religiosity described above: (a)
The ‘intergroup contact theory’ predicts that an increase in the relative size of the immi-
grant religious group (or any other minority) provides contact opportunities for the
local population and the minority religious group, which in turn diminishes tension
and prejudice against that group (Adida et al. 2011). If the ‘bridging’ factor of religiosity
dominates, thus facilitating more contact between the native and immigrant popula-
tions, less distaste against religious minorities is expected; (b) the ‘group threat theory’,
on the other hand, predicts that an increase in the size of the minority gives rise to hos-
tile attitudes by the dominant native group toward the minority, either because of com-
petition over scarce resources, or because of the perception that the minority is a
symbolic threat to the cultural integrity (Blalock 1967; Adida et al. 2011). If the religios-
ity of immigrants is a ‘buffer’ against the local population leading to less integration
and contact with the native population, the ‘group threat theory’ will govern and more
hostility against religious minorities is expected.
Which component (‘bridge’ or ‘buffer’) dominates? The answer is most probably
country specific. Sociologists often discuss the ‘bridge versus buffer’ metaphor by relat-
ing to “two context-dependent casual mechanisms” (e.g., Connor and Koenig 2013,
page 5), or “contextual effects” (e.g., van Tubergen and Sindradóttir 2011, page 273)
through which religion impinges upon structural integration. The first mechanism
would be triggered in deregulated and pluralistic contexts where religiosity serves as a
bridge to the local population. The second mechanism is assumed to be triggered in
contexts where religion constitutes a “bright” symbolic boundary (Alba 2005); here reli-
gion is a barrier to integration and the religiosity of immigrants serves as a buffer
against the hardships of integration.
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Given that in this study we examine the United States versus Europe, it is helpful to
first present the fundamental differences between the two countries. Two primary
disparities between the United States and Europe are evident: (a) the different religious
setting and the role of religion and religious group identities in public life; and (b) the
religious composition of the immigration flow.a) Americans in general tend to be religious and are probably more religious than
most people in other modern societies. In stark contrast with the United States,
secularization has become almost an ideology in Europe. As Casanova puts it,
“Americans think that they are supposed to be religious, while Europeans think that
they are supposed to be irreligious” (Casanova 2003, page 19). Using the ISSP
(International Social Survey Program): Module Religion (2008)8, García-Muñoz and
Neuman (2012) present frequency distributions of church attendance and prayer of
European and American respondents. They clearly demonstrate that the two types
of religious activity are more intensive within the American sample. In the United
States, religious diversity was endorsed right from the beginning. Herberg (1960)
thesis implies that collective religious identities have been one of the primary ways
of structuring social pluralism in American history. In his words, “almost from the
beginning, the structure of American society pre-supposed diversity and substantial
equality of religious associations” (page 27). In the United States, religion, religious
institutions and religious identities played a central role in the process of incorpor-
ating the old European immigrants into American society. As a result, religious
identities tended to gain salience in the context of immigration to America rather
than losing their influence and continue to have the same function today (Smith 1978;
Warner 2000; Casanova 2006; García-Muñoz and Neuman 2013). Moreover,
immigrants in America try to conform to American standards of religiosity and
sometimes become more religious in their new country (the United States) than
they were in their homeland (Williams 1988). On the other side of the Atlantic,
the Western European countries are secular societies (Swatos and Christiano
1999)9. In light of the limited religious pluralism and secularization, immigrants’
religions (in particular Islam) and religiosity are treated with much suspicion by
European elites and ordinary people alike10.
b) The composition of the immigration flow is different in Europe and in the United
States: the majority of Western European Moslems are immigrants11 and a large share
of immigrants is Moslem. Out of about 69.8 million immigrants in Europe (in 2010,
estimate of the United Nations), 18.3 million belong to the Moslem faith (Pew
Research Center Report 2011). The overlap between immigrant status and the religion
of Islam is even more pronounced in those countries where Moslem immigrants
come predominantly from a single region of origin. Examples are immigrants from
Turkey in the case of Germany, and immigrants from North Africa in the case of
France. In this case, there is an overlap between immigration status, religion, and
racial and socio-demographic background. This overlap magnifies the extent of ‘other-
ness’. Moslem-organized collective identities and their public representations became
a source of anxiety, not only because of their religious ‘otherness’ as non-Christians
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ness in contrast to European secularity. Moreover, there is some evidence that the
religiosity of Moslem immigrants does not change as the time since migration goes by
(Bisin et al. 2008). In the United States, by contrast, Moslems comprise less than 10
percent of all immigrants (3.5 million Moslem immigrants out of a total of 42.8 million
immigrants; United Nations Population Division 2009 and Pew Research Center Re-
port 2011). Moreover, it is estimated that 30 percent-42 percent of all Moslems in the
United States are African-American converts to Islam, complicating the definition of
Islam as a foreign/non-American religion. Also, the Moslem immigrant communities
in the United States are from diverse geographical regions of origin, as well as from
varied socio-demographic backgrounds. All of the above lead to faster assimilation
into the native population (Casanova 2006)12.
These differences between Europe and the United States lead to our core Hypothesis:
the religiosity of immigrants in the United States is of a more pronounced ‘bridging’ nature,
while the religiosity of immigrants in Europe functions mainly as a ‘buffer’ against conflict
with the native population and serves as ‘bonding capital’ that helps immigrants within
their immigrant community. Therefore, the ‘group threat theory’ is expected to dominate in
Europe in contrast to the more dominant ‘intergroup contact theory’ in the United States.3. Empirical analysis – data, descriptive figures and religiosity equations
We use the European Social Survey (ESS, waves 2002-2010) and the American General
Social Survey (GSS, waves 2002-2010) datasets to test the following two hypotheses:
(i) Hypothesis 1: Immigrants (in particular first-generation immigrants) are more
religious than the native population, in both the United States and Europe.
(ii) Hypothesis 2: The religiosity of immigrants in the United States is of a more
pronounced ‘bridging’ nature, while the religiosity of immigrants in Europe functions
mainly as a ‘buffer’ and ‘bonding’ element.
The GSS and the ESS are social surveys designed in the United States and in Europe,
respectively, to obtain the demographic, behavioral and cultural characteristics of their
residents. The GSS is being conducted annually since 1972, and the last available wave
is 2012. The ESS has five waves since 2002 (the first in 2002/2003 and the fifth in
2010/2011). The two surveys include questions on individuals’ religious denomination
and on other various measures of religiosity, and allow the distinction between natives
and first- and second-generation immigrants.
The two samples used for the statistical analyses include pooled waves for the period
2002-2010. We restricted our analysis to samples that include individuals in the 20-90
age interval, who belong to the following religious denominations: Catholic, Protestant,
Orthodox, other Christian religions, Jewish and Moslem. The GSS allows distinguishing
between different sub-categories of Protestants. Using the classification system devel-
oped by Steensland et al. (2000), we distinguish between black Protestants, evangelical
Protestants, and mainline Protestants. This distinction is not available in the ESS. Re-
spondents belonging to other religions have been omitted from the analysis due to the
small sample sizes of these groups. Individuals who claim to have ‘no religion’ have also
been excluded from the statistical analysis13.
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countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Descriptive statistics for both samples
(ESS-Europe and GSS-US) can be found in the Additional file 1.
Regression analysis is now used (with the same data from the 2002-2010 waves of the
European ESS and the American GSS) to test Hypothesis 1, that is, immigrants (first-
and second-generation) are more religious than the native respective populations in
Europe and the United States.
Table 4 presents regression equations for two elements of religiosity: (i) Attendance
at religious services at the place of worship (‘church attendance’ based on the question
“How often do you attend religious services?”, ranging from ‘never’ to ‘every day’ on a
scale of 1-7 in the ESS and on a scale of 0-8 in the GSS); and (ii) prayer habits (‘prayer’
based on the question “How often do you pray?”, ranging from ‘never’ to ‘every day’ on
a scale of 1-7 in the ESS and 1-6 in the GSS). Church attendance is a public religious
activity that also includes elements of networking. Prayer has a private/intimate nature.
The equations for the two sides of the Atlantic include the same explanatory variables
in order to facilitate a comparative analysis of the results. The two core variables are
the ‘first-generation immigrants’ (a dummy variable if the respondent and his/her
parents were not born in the current country of residence) and ‘second-generation
immigrants’ (a dummy variable if the respondent was born in the current country
of residence but both of his/her parents were born in other countries). The battery of
other explanatory variables includes categorical variables related to age groups
(20-30 - reference; 31-45; 46-59; 60 or older); education groups(less than six years
of education - reference; 7-12; 13-16; more than 16 years); marital status (single - reference;
married or cohabiting; divorced or separated; widowed); employment status (retired, at
school or home-keeper - reference; employee; self-employed; unemployed); a low income
dummy variable if the total family annual income is less than 6000 euros; the
number of people in household14; a female dummy; and the religious denominations
(Catholic - reference; Protestant; Orthodox; other Christian denominations; Jewish;
Moslem). The European regressions also include country dummies, and all regressions
include controls for the waves.
Linear Ordinary Least Squares regressions were used and standard errors were
adjusted for clustering at the country level (in European regressions). Switching to
Ordered Logit/Probit regressions did not lead to substantial changes. Population and
survey design weights were also taken into account.
Hypothesis 1, which states that Immigrants are more religious than the native population,
is clearly supported by the European data: the coefficients of first-generation European im-
migrants are positive and significant for the two dimensions of religiosity, indicating that
first-generation immigrants in Europe are indeed more religious than the native population
(the reference group)15. The size of the coefficients in “attendance” and the “prayer”
equations drop when second-generation immigrants are considered, but the coefficients
are still significant. In the United States the results are weaker: first-generation immigrants
seem to be more religious in terms of church attendance, but less religious in terms of
prayer (indicating a ‘bridging’ factor of religiosity – see below).









EUROPE US EUROPE US
Immigrant var.
First generation 0.272*** 0.342*** 0.646*** −0.133**
Second generation 0.166* −0.072 0.353** −0.109
Socio-economic vars.
Age (years)
30 and under ref. ref. ref. ref.
31 to 45 0.110*** 0.037 0.225*** 0.198***
46 to 59 0.220*** 0.144 0.471*** 0.364***
60 and over 0.501*** 0.605*** 1.033*** 0.360***
Education
(years completed)
Less than 6 ref. ref. ref. ref.
7 to 12 -0.141** -0.236 -0.253*** -0.186*
13 to 16 −0.088 0.209 −0.259*** −0.069
17 and over 0.027 0.703*** −0.095 −0.027
Female 0.302*** 0.559*** 0.971*** 0.704***
Members in household 0.070*** 0.061** 0.086*** 0.012
Marital status
Single ref. ref. ref. ref.
Married 0.126*** 0.663*** 0.175*** 0.210***
Divorced −0.127*** −0.133 0.083* 0.082
Widowed 0.143*** 0.620*** 0.533*** 0.256***
Low income −0.006 −0.220 0.200*** 0.150**
Employment status
Retired/student/home ref. ref. ref. ref.
Employee -0.251*** 0.049 -0.237*** -0.146***
Self-employed −0.177** −0.085 −0.135* −0.099
Unemployed −0.115*** −0.246 −0.125** −0.107
Religion var.





Orthodox −0.431* −0.850* −0.407 −0.556*
Other Christian 0.725*** 0.070 0.986*** 0.346***
Jewish −0.400** −1.594*** −0.292 −1.313***
Moslem −0.162 0.556 0.333 0.771**
Country dummies Yes - Yes -
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 107,361 6,547 107,361 6,547
R-squared 0.183 0.079 0.190 0.124
*p-value < 0.10; **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value < 0.01.
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tion. Decomposing the ‘first-generation’ variable into five time-since-migration intervals
(immigrated last year; 1-5 years; 6-10 years; 11-20 years; more than 20 years; the refer-
ence group is natives) demonstrates an inverse-U pattern. Table 3 shows that immigrants
at the first year since migration and immigrants who live in the receiving country more
than 20 years are not significantly different from the natives in terms of church
attendance. Those who arrived recently are most probably preoccupied with urgent set-
tling problems, which temporarily prevent them from spending time on religious per-
formance - a finding in line with other studies related to immigrants in Europe (e.g., a
recent study by Diehl et al. 2013, who used the SCIP longitudinal data set). Immigrants
who live in the host country for over 20 years adapted to the local patterns and are not
different from natives. Those who live in the host country 1-20 years are more religious
than the native population, with some tendency for a decrease in religiosity as time
passes by. Prayer, which has a more intimate/private nature, is higher among immigrants
in all time-since-migration intervals, increases after the first year in the receiving coun-
try, and constantly decreases thereafter.
The socio-economic and religious denomination variables (in regressions Tables 4
and 3, but only presented in Table 4) serve as control variables16. Most coefficient esti-
mates are quite similar in Europe and in the United States and are in line with the find-
ings of many other studies: women are more religious than men; single individuals tend
to be less religious compared to married and widowed individuals; the number of
people in the household has a positive significant effect on religiosity; low income in-
creases prayer; unemployed individuals attend church services less frequently; advanced
age leads to more intensive religiosity (in particular above the age of 60); and there is
some tendency toward decreased religiosity when the individual is more educated. One
interesting exception is the increase in church attendance of US respondents with more
than 13 years of education. These respondents attend church activities more frequently
than individuals with a less than academic education, probably because they benefit
more from networking and the contact effects.
We now turn to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: In European countries the ‘buffer-bonding motive’ is dominant,
whereas in the United States the ‘bridging motive’ is more powerful.
Obviously, it is impossible to explicitly sort out the two types of motives and offer an
estimate of their sizes. However, the results in Table 4 provide several clear indications
in support of this hypothesis on the dominant motives on the two sides of the Atlantic.
1. In the United States, first-generation immigrants attend church religious services
more frequently than the native population. However, first-generation immigrants
pray less compared to natives. Attendance at church services has a clearly dominant
networking and bridging element. Prayer has no bridging component and can only
serve as a ‘buffer’ and “balm for the soul”. More frequent attendance at church
services (compared to natives), coupled with less prayer habits, therefore points
toward the dominance of the bridging component. In sharp contrast, immigrants in
European countries are more active than natives in terms of prayer.
2. The coefficients that present the most intensive religiosity of immigrants in Europe
are much larger in the ‘prayer equation’ than in the ‘church attendance equation’
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and providing a “balm for the soul”. It can serve as a 'buffer' and shield against the
harsh conditions faced by new immigrants. The larger magnitude of the prayer
coefficients in Europe can therefore serve as another indication of the superiority of
the ‘bonding-buffer’ motive17.
3. An interesting finding relates to second-generation immigrants (Table 4). In the
United States, there is evidence of ‘religious assimilation’ and the second-generation
immigrants are not significantly different from natives (in terms of church attendance
and in terms of prayer). On the other hand, second-generation immigrants in Europe
are still more active religiously than natives, particularly in terms of praying.
The intensity drops in the second generation, but is still significantly higher compared to
natives. These results can be explained by the need for comfort and a “balm for the
soul” that does not fade away in the second generation. This finding is in line with the
sociological “religious vitality theory” which highlights the role of religious socialization
within immigrant families and communities (against the “secularization theory” which
predicts an inverse relationship between religiosity and structural integration in the
receiving country, see Fleischmann and Phalet 2012). Obviously, religious socialization
within families and communities has dominant bonding effects. The theory predicts
the maintenance of intensified religiosity (compared to natives) and even the revival of
religious performance among second-generation immigrants. Compatible with this
prediction, we see that second-generation immigrants in Europe indeed seem to be
more religious than their first-generation counterparts who have lived in the host
countries for more than 20 years. As Table 3 shows, while the latter behave like the
native populations (in terms of church attendance, their prayer practices are more
intense only at a 10 percent significance level), there is a revival of the two dimensions
of religious performance among second-generation immigrants. The ‘religious vitality
theory’ also claims that the trends mentioned above are more pronounced among
immigrants who belong to minority religions where there is more need for the comfort
and ease that is provided within families. In line with this prediction, recent studies
have documented an emerging trend toward religious revival among second-generation
Moslems in Europe: for instance, in the Netherlands (Maliepaard et al. 2010) and in four
European capital cities (Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels and Stockholm - Fleischmann and
Phalet 2012, using recent cross-national surveys from The Integration of European
Second Generation – TIES – project). The ESS data also indicate that in European
countries, second-generation immigrants who do not belong to the country’s main
religion maintain the high levels of religiosity of the first-generation (see next point and
Table 5).
4. Immigrants might find a shield and buffer in religiosity, particularly in response to
social exclusion and experiences of discrimination. It follows that immigrants who
have a religious denomination that is different from the main country’s
denomination and who may be subject to religious unease or discrimination if they
reside in European countries that do not have a culture of religious diversity and
tolerance will then turn to intensive religiosity to find comfort. In fact, this could be
the case also for European natives in Europe who belong to a denomination that is
different from the country’s main denomination. On the other side of the Atlantic,
in the United States, which enjoys a “religious supermarket” and tolerates a
Table 5 Attendance at religious services and prayer in Europe and the US, 2002-2010









EUROPE US EUROPE US
Immigrant var.
First-generation
Not main rel. 0.365*** 0.308** 0.662*** −0.147**
Main rel. −0.373* 1.676*** −0.616 0.588***
Second-generation
Not main rel. 0.429*** 0.026 0.354 −0.103
Main rel. −0.576*** 0.221 −0.841*** 0.376
Natives - Main religion −0.525*** 0.739*** −1.076*** 0.478***
Socio-economic vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Religious denomination variables Yes No22 Yes No
Country dummies Yes - Yes -
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 107,361 6,547 107,361 6,547
R-squared 0.190 0.068 0.200 0.100
*p-value < 0.10; **p-value < 0.05; ***p-value < 0.01.
Note: Reference group = Natives who do not belong to the country’s main religion.
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major religion does not lead to discriminatory feelings or the need to find comfort
in religious activity. Moreover, as churches in the United States have the social
functions of bridges and networks, belonging to a church other than the main
country’s church could lead to a diminished benefit from the networking/bridging
element and consequently to less religiosity of immigrants and natives alike. To test
this conjecture, we split first- and second-generation immigrants and also natives
each into two sub-groups: those who share the country’s main religion and those
who do not18. The regressions in Table 4 are then repeated and extended. The
regression results are presented in Table 5. As we hypothesized above, ‘not belonging
to the country’s main religion’ has different effects (on both natives and on immi-
grants) in Europe and the United States. In Europe, native individuals who do not be-
long to the country’s main religion tend to participate significantly more in church
services and also pray significantly more compared to natives who share the country’s
main religion (coefficients of 0.525 and 1.076 respectively; significant at the 0.01 signifi-
cance level). This finding could indicate that native individuals who do not belong to
the country’s main religion feel discriminated and find comfort in religious perform-
ance. Moreover, the difference in intensity of prayer is larger compared to that of
church attendance (a double-sized coefficient for variables that have the same range of
1-7). This further indicates the dominance of the ‘buffer-bonding’ element of religious
activity, which is more pronounced in the intimate act of prayer. In the United States,
the opposite is found, where ‘belonging to the country’s main religion’ leads to signifi-
cantly more religious activity, most probably because native individuals who belong to
the country’s main religion can use the bridging elements of religious activity more ef-
fectively (coefficient of 0.739 for church attendance; significant at 0.01)19. Moreover,
first-generation immigrants in Europe who do not share the country’s main religion
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compared to natives who do not belong to the country’s main religion, whereas in the
United States they decrease prayer by 0.147. This further suggests that prayer serves
as “balm for the soul” for those Europeans who feel alienated.
5. Another indirect indicator of the dominance of the ‘bridging’ effect versus the
‘bonding-buffer’ effect could be gained from an insightful reading of the results of
an experimental test of the ‘intergroup contact theory’ versus the ‘group threat
theory’. As mentioned above, the ‘intergroup contact theory’ predicts that an
increase in the relative size of a (religious) minority provides contact opportunities
with the minority and leads to less discrimination. This is the case if religiosity
serves as a bridging element. The ‘group threat theory’ predicts that an increase in
the relative size of a minority leads to a rise in the threat to the native population
and hence to intensified hostility. This could be the case if religiosity serves as a
bonding element within the minority/immigrant community and a buffer against the
native community. If we relate this to Adida et al. (2011), who found support for
the threat theory (toward the Moslem religious minority), it can be claimed that
their findings also lend support to the dominance of the ‘buffer-bonding’ motive
rather than the ‘bridging’ motive. The experiment was conducted in France only and
there is no comparable experiment for the United States. However, it offers some
additional evidence in the same vein.4. Concluding remarks
Immigration and the religiosity of immigrants are key factors in shaping the religious and
demographic landscape of Europe and the United States. Given that, particularly in
Europe, immigrants are more religious than the native populations and due to the demo-
graphic advantage of religious immigrant populations caused by (i) the dramatic decrease
in fertility rates within secular native European populations20; which is (ii) combined with
high fertility rates among the religious immigrant populations21; and (iii) coupled with the
immigration of more religious groups into secular countries, the long-term consequences
will be: 1) a constant and drastic change in the religious makeup, with a growing share of
more religious residents in general and of members of the Islam faith in particular;
and 2) de-secularization and growing religious intensity.
The evolution and the motives of the immigration-religiosity intersections are fundamen-
tally different on the two sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, religiosity seems to serve
as a ‘bridge’ that helps immigrants in the integration process. In Europe, the intensified re-
ligiosity of immigrants seems to serve more as a ‘buffer’ and shock-absorber, offering com-
fort and a shield against the hardships that newcomers face. These fundamental differences
are the results of the different religious cultures and religious landscapes of the two regions,
and also of the different mix of immigration flows. In particular, American religious plural-
ism allows immigrants to choose between creating their own religious communities and
joining local religious organizations. In both cases, religious activity provides refuge, secur-
ity, and various services and resources (employment, housing, education), and connects the
immigrants and the native population, thus smoothening the integration process.
The situation in Europe is totally different: religious pluralism in Europe is limited.
European society has difficulty in recognizing collective group religiosity and the legitimate
Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman IZA Journal of Migration Page 18 of 232013, 2:23
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/23role of religion in public life. Combined with the restricted religious pluralism, and
European relative secularization, immigrants’ religions (in particular Islam) and religiosity
are treated with much suspicion by European elites and ordinary people alike. In Europe,
the ‘group threat theory’ seems to govern, and the increase in the size of religious minorities
gives rise to hostile attitudes by the dominant native population toward the religious mi-
nority. The predicted growing share of Moslem immigrants in European countries will
potentially become a source of deep social and religious tensions. Solutions to the discrim-
ination against Moslems are therefore of urgent concern. However, as Paluck and Green
(2009) show, evidence on prejudice-reducing policies is at best inconclusive.
Prejudice against Moslems in the West (termed Islamophobia), has become a topic of
growing research interest (e.g., Strabac and Listhaug 2008; Helbling 2012). One of the
major questions raised in the literature relates to feedback effects: what are the conse-
quences of public hostility for the religiosity of Moslems (and other religious minorities
confronted with prejudice and discrimination)? Voas and Fleischmann (2012) presented
three possible consequences: (a) Moslems might become more religious in response to
external negative valuations of Islam; (b) they might be motivated to scale back their
religious identity, belief and practice; or (c) prejudice and discrimination might have no
effect on religious commitment. The empirical results tend to support the first op-
tion, but are inconclusive (see a review in Voas and Fleischmann 2012, pp. 536-
537). The results of our regression equation for Europe (but not for the United
States) are in line with the first option of “reactive religiosity”. The fact that
second-generation immigrants in Europe who do not share the country’s main reli-
gion are as religious as first-generation immigrants, could indicate that religiosity
is used as a buffer against the religious discrimination of minority religions and
does not change even in a second-generation composed of individuals who were
already born in the receiving countries. Such an outcome is also backed by social
psychologists who provide ample evidence, mainly based on experiments, for a
rejection-identification mechanism: in response to discriminatory treatment, indi-
viduals identify with their group more strongly to buffer negative consequences for
their self-esteem (e.g., Branscombe et al. 1999).Endnotes
1Numerous articles refer to the relationship between religiosity of immigrants and
labor market integration, e.g., Lindley 2002; Aleksynska and Algan 2010; Bisin et al. 2011;
Connor 2011; Connor and Koenig 2013.
2In the last decade – between 2000 and 2013 – West- and South-East Asia also evidenced
a major influx of migrants, in particular into the oil-producing countries in West Asia and
the fast-growing countries in South-East Asia (e.g., Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand). During
13 years (2000-2013), 20 million new immigrants arrived in these countries (data published
by the United Nations, The Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2013, on 11th of
September). This newly published report also states that the total estimated number of mi-
grants rose to 232 million, constituting 3.2 percent of the world's population.
3It is estimated that about 85 million Europeans immigrated to the New World and
the Southern Hemisphere during the period of ‘industrialization’ (from the 1800 s to
the 1920s), 60% of them to the United States (Casanova 2006).
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labor recruitment agreement with Italy that permitted German farmers to hire Italian
guest workers. Shortly afterwards, bilateral agreements were signed with another seven
recruitment countries: Greece, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia and also three countries out-
side of Europe, specifically Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Guest worker programs still
play an important role in the admission of migrant workers from low-income countries
to fill jobs in high-income countries. See Ruhn and Martin (2008) for a review and
discussion.
5The heterogeneity of the countries of origin led to large variations in the educational
attainments and wages of immigrants in Europe: immigrants from non-OECD coun-
tries have lower educational levels and wages, particularly when compared to natives
and immigrants from the EU15 countries (Dustmann and Frattini 2011).
6The term ‘first-generation immigrants’ refers to individuals who were not born in
the current country of residence and also their parents were born outside the current
country of residence. ‘Second-generation immigrants’ were born in their current coun-
try of residence but their two parents were born in other countries.
7Connor (2008) used the “Enquete sur L’establissement des Nouveaux Immigrants” (ENI)
sponsored by the Quebec government during the 1990s. Massey and Higgins (2011) used
the first wave of the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), and Diehl et al. (2013) employed the first
wave of “Socio-Cultural Integration Processes of New Immigrants in Europe” (SCIP).
8For more on the ISSP, see Brañas-Garza and Neuman (2004) and Bar-El et al. (2013).
9Obviously, there are differences between countries within Europe in term of shares of
the secular populations. Cyprus and Poland are the most religious countries in Europe
(in 2008), while at the other end the Scandinavian countries, the Czech Republic and
Estonia are the most secular countries (ISSP 2008 databased on frequencies of church at-
tendance and prayer, not reported here, but can be provided upon request).
10There are obviously differences between European countries in terms of the regu-
lation of religious minorities (Casanova 2006): France’s ‘etatist’ secularist model re-
quires the strict privatization of religion, eliminating religion from any public forum.
Great Britain allows greater freedom of religious associations and their contacts with
local authorities. The Netherlands encouraged the establishment of a state-regulated
but self-organized separate Moslem pillar. Germany has tried to organize a quasi-
official Islamic institution (the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs – DITIB)
in conjunction with Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). There are, how-
ever, other Moslem organizations who claim to represent the German Moslem popula-
tion (Ogelman 2003).
11Moslem populations have lived in the Balkans and Eastern Europe for centuries.
There has also been a Moslem presence in Western Europe. However, the large
Moslem populations that today live in Western Europe arrived after World War II
(Fetzer and Soper 2005). As descriptive statistics in the Additional file 1 (based on ESS data)
shows, in the samples used in our statistical analysis, only about one percent of European na-
tive populations are Moslem compared to 17 percent within first-generation immigrants and
14 percent within second-generation immigrants.
12This, however, did not prevent expressions of hostility and discrimination against
Moslems after the 9/11 attacks. For instance, Davila and Mora (2005) found that subsequent
to the attacks, middle-Eastern Arabs have experienced a significant decline in earnings.
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percent in the European EES survey and 16.1 percent in the American GSS sur-
vey. A recent report published by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion
& Public Life (on the 18th of December, 2012) claims that the third largest 'reli-
gion' is the ‘no religion’ – it is estimated that there are 1.1 billion individuals who
claim to have 'no religion' (16 percent of the world population. The majority lives
in communist countries (700 million in China). Christianity is the largest religion
(2.2 billion individuals comprising 32 percent of the world population) followed
by Islam in second place (1.6 billion individuals comprising 23 percent of the
world population). After the third ‘no religion’ denomination, the fourth is Hindu
(1 billion individuals) and the fifth is Buddhism (0.5 billion). Only 14 million indi-
viduals belong to the faith of Judaism (0.02 percent of world population). Individ-
uals with ‘no religion’ were included in a previous version of the study and are
now excluded based on the comment of one of the referees. Interestingly, even
individuals who claim to have ‘no religion’ report religious activities such as at-
tending church services and praying. The Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion and
Public Life (2012) also states that many of those who report a denomination of ‘no
religion’ still believe in some spiritual ‘superpower’. This is why they were included
in the analysis in several studies of religious performance (e.g., Aleksynska and
Chiswick 2013).
14We use this variable as a proxy of number of children because the ESS does not in-
clude data on the number of children.
15Moreover, there also seems to be a time-trend of constant increase in the dis-
parities between religious practices of immigrants versus natives. This time-trend is
most probably led by increased religious participation of (Moslem) immigrants in
Europe versus a decrease in participation of European natives. Using three waves
of the ISSP: Module Religion (1991, 1998, 2008-the last available wave) and look-
ing at percentages of individuals at the lowest end of the religiosity scale - defined
as the share of individuals who ‘never pray’ and individuals who ‘never attend
church/mosque/synagogue services’ reveals a constant and quite dramatic drop in
the share of secular Moslems: the percentage of Moslems who ‘never pray’ was
27.72 in 1991, 25.07 in 1998, and only 7.23 in 2008. The percentage of Moslems
who ‘never attend church services’ dropped from 35.85 in 1991 to 27.35 in 1998,
and further decreased to 16.70 in 2008. Parallel figures for native populations show
an increase in secularization rates between 1991 and 2008. For a more extensive
discussion see Kaufmann 2010; Pew Research Center Report 2011; Toft et al. 2011;
and García-Muñoz and Neuman 2012, 2013.
16We refer to the socio-economic personal characteristics as control variables, with the
focus on the variables related to the immigration-religiosity intersections. Sociologists
usually treat socio-economic variables as core variables and present general theories that
predict the effects of these variables. For a review of theories see, for instance, Smits et al.
(2010) and van Tubergen and Sindradóttir (2011). The main three sociological theories are
the insecurity theory (which predicts – for instance - that individuals with a permanent job
are least likely to participate in religious practices, the unemployed participate the most,
and individuals with a temporary job fall in between; however, our results are not in line
with this hypothesis, as we find that unemployed individuals have lower frequencies of
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stance - more educated individuals participate less); the social integration theory (for
instance -individuals who live in urban areas are less likely to participate in religious
practices).
17There could, however, be other explanations as well. For instance, (i) church attend-
ance is more costly (in terms of time and also financial expenditures) and it is therefore
cheaper to intensify prayer habits; (ii) in Islam, praying several times a day is more of
an indicator of intensive religiosity than in Christianity: As immigrants to Europe, but
not to the US, include a large percentage of Moslems, we find a stronger effect of
immigration status on prayer in Europe.
18Interestingly, while not surprisingly, the shares of both natives and immigrants who
do not share the country's main religion are much larger in the United States than in
Europe, due to America's religious diversity. The respective figures are: 66 percent of
natives in the United States compared to 17 percent of natives in Europe. Over 85
percent of immigrants in the United States versus 45 percent of immigrants in
Europe (see the Additional file 1).
19Native Americans who do not share the country's main religion also pray less
compared to those who belong to the country main religion. This result can
probably be explained by inconformity: if an individual is different in terms of
her/his religious denomination, she/he is also different in the sense that she/he is
less religious compared to the 'average' religious American.
20During the last decades, most European countries have faced a dramatic drop
in fertility rates. Eurostat data show that, the number of live births in Europe in
1970 was 7.15 million babies, while in 2010 this figure decreased to 5.36 million.
The most pronounced changes in the average number of live births per woman
are evidenced in the European Catholic countries: Ireland (from 3.8 in the early
1970s to 2.1 in 2010), Spain (from 2.2 in the early 1980s to 1.4 in 2010), Portugal
(from 3.0 in the early 1970s to 1.4 in 2010), Italy (from 2.4 in 1970 to 1.4 in
2009), and Poland (from 2.1 in 1990 to 1.4 in 2010). There was a marginal small
decrease in fertility in the United States: from 2.2 births per woman in 1970 to 2.1
in 2009 (United Nations Population Division 2009).
21Fertility rates are significantly higher within the immigrant populations. An
examination of national country measures shows that in the UK in 2010, the Total
Fertility Rate (TFR) of UK-born mothers was 1.88 versus 2.45 for non-UK born
mothers (Office for National Statistics-ONS, UK); in Sweden in 2010, the TFR for
Swedish mothers was 1.8 compared to 2.3 for foreign mothers (Statistics Sweden);
and in Switzerland in 2010, TRF measures were 1.4 and 1.9 for Swiss and foreign-born
mothers, respectively (Swiss Statistical Office).
22In the American equation, the dummies for religious denomination are excluded to
avoid multicollinearity with ‘does not belong to the main (Evangelical-Protestant)
religion’. The results are therefore not fully comparable.Additional file
: Appendix. Table S1, ESS-Europe: descriptive statistics, 2002-2010. Table S2, GSS-US descriptive
statistics, 2002-2010.
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